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ANOTHER CHAPTER IN THE 
COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE ON 
CIVIL LIBERTIES AT 
GUANTANAMO BAY 
AMANDA MCRAE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On November 13, 2001, the President issued an Executive Military 
Order that gave him the power to declare individuals unlawful 
combatants and detain them indefinitely, thus curtailing their rights 
with respect to criminal charges, a trial, and legal counsel.1 This Order 
began the infamous detentions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a base over 
which the United States has overall “control and jurisdiction,” but 
where “ultimate sovereignty” remains with the Cuban government.2 
Over the past seven years, the Supreme Court has consistently 
questioned the legality of indefinite detentions of enemy combatants 
at Guantanamo because of the base’s geographic and historical 
relationship to the United States. 
After the Court’s decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,3 Rasul v. Bush,4 
and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,5 all of which conferred certain fundamental 
rights on detainees held at Guantanamo or within the UNITED 
 
 *  2009 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 2. Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, T.S. No. 418 (Feb. 
23, 1903). 
 3. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that U.S. citizens detained as enemy 
combatants must, for due process reasons, be given an opportunity to challenge their detentions 
before a neutral body). 
 4. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that non-citizens may pursue habeas corpus 
claims). 
 5. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (finding that the military commissions 
violated portions of the Geneva Conventions and that the Detainee Treatment Act did not 
apply to cases already pending). 
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STATES during the War on Terror, Congress reacted to once again 
curtail those rights. Congress passed, first, the Detainee Treatment Act 
of 2005 (“DTA”),6 and second, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
(“MCA”),7 both of which sought to strip federal courts of jurisdiction 
to hear habeas petitions filed by aliens detained at Guantanamo.8 In 
doing so, Congress amended the statutory right to habeas corpus, 
which the Court in Rasul had ruled extended to detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay.9 
In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court determined whether detainees 
at Guantanamo Bay have a constitutional right to habeas corpus, and 
if so, whether the process available to detainees to review their 
detentions under the DTA and the MCA is an adequate substitute to 
the regular habeas corpus process.10 In holding that Guantanamo 
detainees do in fact have a constitutional right to habeas corpus, and 
that the process available to challenge their detentions is inadequate, 
the Court challenged the Executive’s role in waging war and 
vindicated the civil liberties of the detainees. 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This case consists of two consolidated cases from the District of 
Columbia Circuit: Boumediene v. Bush11 and Al-Odah v. United 
States12. Petitioners in both cases sought habeas corpus review of the 
legality of their indefinite detentions at Guantanamo Bay. The 
Boumediene petitioners were six Algerian nationals who were also 
permanent residents of Bosnia.13 They were arrested by Bosnian 
officials in October of 2001 and accused of plotting to bomb the 
United States Embassy in Sarajevo.14 In January 2002, they were 
 
 6. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, PL 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005) (codified at 10 
U.S.C.A. § 801 (West 2008); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd (West 2008); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 
2008)). 
 7. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified 
in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.A. (West 2008)). 
 8. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e) (West 2008) (“No court, justice, or judge shall have 
jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of 
an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have 
been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.”). 
 9. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480–82. 
 10. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241 (2008). 
 11. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 12. Al-Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 13. Brief for Petitioners at 1, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (No. 06-1195) 
[hereinafter Brief for Boumediene Petitioners]. 
 14. Id. at 2. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/27/2009 10:13:50 AM 
2009] BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH 249 
transferred into United States custody and were then taken to 
Guantanamo Bay.15 The Al-Odah petitioners consisted of four Kuwaiti 
citizens and twelve Yemeni citizens who were detained at 
Guantanamo Bay for varying lengths of time over the past seven 
years.16 
The Boumediene petitioners commenced habeas corpus 
proceedings in July 2004,17 while the Al-Odah petitioners sought 
habeas corpus review starting in 200218. While these cases made their 
way through the federal courts, Congress passed the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, which stripped the federal courts of 
jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus petitions filed by alien 
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay,19 and the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006, which applied the DTA retroactively.20 The DTA and the 
MCA effectively shut down the habeas corpus actions of both the 
Boumediene and Al-Odah petitioners.21 
Starting in 2005, the Department of Defense implemented 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”).22 During these 
tribunals, detainees could challenge their designations as “enemy 
combatants” and thus their indefinite detentions at Guantanamo Bay 
in front of a military commission that provided some, though limited, 
judicial procedures.23 After the passage of the MCA, the CSRT 
procedure was the only option remaining for Guantanamo Bay 
detainees under which they could challenge the legality of their 
detentions. Although the CSRT procedure included limited review in 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, it did not include a formal habeas 
corpus proceeding.24  
In February 2007, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the 
Boumediene petitioners’ habeas corpus actions, ruling that the MCA 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Al Odah v. U.S., 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (No. 06-1196) 
[hereinafter Brief for Al Odah Petitioners]. 
 17. Brief for Boumediene Petitioners, supra note 13, at 3. 
 18. Brief for Al Odah Petitioners, supra note 16, at 3. 
 19. Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2742 §1005(e)(1) (2005). 
 20. See Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2636 § 7(a) (2006). 
 21. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 22. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of 
the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, July 7, 2004, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. 
 23. Id. 
 24. 10 U.S.C.A. § 950(g) (West 2008) (providing for review of CSRT determinations in the 
D.C. Circuit but no right to habeas corpus). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/27/2009 10:13:50 AM 
250 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:247 
stripped the court of jurisdiction to hear their habeas corpus 
petitions.25 The D.C. Circuit concluded that the Suspension Clause26, 
which formed the basis for the petitioners’ claims, did not at the time 
of the ratification of the Constitution in 1789 apply to aliens outside 
the “sovereign territory” of the United States and that aliens without 
connections to the United States did not have any rights under the 
Clause.27 
The Al-Odah case took a much more circuitous path.  This habeas 
corpus case was first filed on February 19, 2002.28 The Supreme Court 
considered the Al-Odah habeas petition along with Rasul v. Bush in 
the Court’s 2004 opinion.29 After Rasul, the Al-Odah case was 
remanded to the District Court, where it became part of the In re 
Guantanamo Detainees Cases decided in 2005.30 After the passage of 
the DTA and MCA, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the Al-Odah 
petitioners’ claims at the same time it dismissed the claims for the 
Boumediene petitioners.31 
Both sets of detainees petitioned for certiorari in the Supreme 
Court.32 The Court initially denied cert in April 2007,33 but on June 29, 
2007, the Court, in a rare move,34 reopened the petitions and granted 
cert for the October 2007 term.35 Oral arguments occurred on 
December 5, 2007. 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
There were three main questions in front of the Supreme Court in 
Boumediene v. Bush: (1) whether alien detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
have a constitutional right to habeas corpus review; (2) whether, if 
 
 25. Brief for Boumediene Petitioners, supra note 13,at 6. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
 27. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 990–91 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 28. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Al-Odah v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (Mar. 5, 2007) 
(No. 06-1196). 
 29. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 30. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 31. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 32. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 U.S. 2229 (March 5, 2007) 
(No. 06-1195); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28. 
 33. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1725 (Apr. 2, 2007) (denying cert.). 
 34. See William Glaberson, “In Shift, Justices Agree to Hear Detainees’ Case,” N.Y. TIMES 
(June 30, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/30/washington/30scotus.html?_r= 
1&scp=1&sq=Boumediene&st=nyt (reporting on the rarity of the Court overturning its own 
decision not to grant certiorari). 
 35. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (Jun. 29, 2007) (granting cert.). 
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detainees do have this constitutional right, the MCA is an 
unconstitutional suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus; and (3) if 
the detainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus review, 
whether the CSRT review process provides an adequate and effective 
substitute for that review.36 In all of the litigation surrounding the 
detainees at Guantanamo, the Court had yet to answer these three 
essential questions. 
A. The Basics of Habeas Corpus 
At its most basic level, the Writ of Habeas Corpus protects 
individuals from illegal executive detention.37 The Writ is considered 
“the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom 
against arbitrary and lawless state action.”38 Thus the Writ maintains 
an important place in the operation of a free society, guaranteeing the 
liberty such a society promises. 
Habeas corpus is guaranteed in two different ways in American 
federal law: in the Constitution and in the federal habeas corpus 
statute. Constitutional habeas corpus stems from the Suspension 
Clause, which states, “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion 
the public Safety may require it.”39 This constitutional restriction on 
suspending habeas corpus underscores the importance of the right 
and places limits on both Congress and the Executive in exercising 
their powers. Constitutional habeas corpus applies to all United States 
citizens detained by the United States, regardless of the location of 
their detention, as well as to aliens detained within the “sovereign 
territory” of the United States.40 
In addition to the Suspension Clause, federal legislation also has 
established the right to habeas corpus, beginning with the Judiciary 
Act of 1789.41 The current federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 
2241, does not confer a right to habeas corpus but rather confers 
jurisdiction on the federal courts to determine the legality of a 
 
 36. Brief for Boumediene Petitioners, supra note 13, at i; Brief for Al-Odah Petitioners, 
supra note 16, at i; Brief of Respondent at I, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 U.S. 2229 (Nos. 06-1195, 
06-1196). 
 37. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus: Jurisdiction, Substantive 
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2037 (2007). 
 38. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290–91 (1969). 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 9, cl 2. 
 40. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S 466, 481–82 (2004). 
 41. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stats. 81–82. 
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detention when a prisoner “is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”42 There are, 
however, currently several statutory restrictions on the right to habeas 
corpus for aliens. 
B. Habeas for Aliens 
1. Statutory Habeas 
Statutory habeas extends to aliens, even those held outside the 
federal court jurisdiction in which they file, as long as the person 
under whose authority they are being held can be reached by service 
of process.43 In Rasul v. Bush, the Court extended this logic by stating 
that this statutory right to file outside of the jurisdiction of detention 
applied to alien enemy combatants being held at Guantanamo Bay.44 
The Court justified this application of the Writ by analyzing its 
historical reach. For instance, the Court found that in England, prior 
to the American Revolution, the Writ applied in England’s 
“dominions”45 or anywhere “‘under the subjection of the crown,’” not 
just within the state of England.46 Because Guantanamo Bay Naval 
Base is under the “complete jurisdiction and control” of the United 
States,47 it is, according to the Court in Rasul, essentially within the 
“dominions” of the United States and under its subjection.48 
Conferring a statutory right to habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
on alien detainees at Guantanamo was thus consistent with this 
historical application and in conformance with the federal habeas 
corpus statute.49 
After 2004, however, statutory habeas no longer extended to 
aliens held at Guantanamo Bay because, in response to Rasul, 
Congress amended the federal habeas statute via the DTA and the 
MCA.50 The DTA and the MCA stripped federal courts of jurisdiction 
to hear habeas corpus petitions from Guantanamo detainees, other 
 
 42. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c)(3) (West 2008). 
 43. Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973). 
 44. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473. 
 45. Id. at 481–82 (citing King v. Overton, 1 Sid. 387, 82 Eng. Rep. 1173 (K.B. 1668)). 
 46. Id. (quoting King v. Cowle, 2 Burr. 834, 854–55, 97 Eng. Rep. 587, 598–99 (K.B. 1759)). 
 47. Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, T.S. No. 418 (Feb, 
23, 1903). 
 48. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 482–83. 
 49. Id. at 482. 
 50. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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aliens deemed “enemy combatants,” or people awaiting such 
determination.51 These laws dramatically limited any statutory habeas 
claims that alien prisoners at Guantanamo could bring, thus forcing 
them to rely either upon constitutional habeas protections or upon 
the CSRT process.52 
2. Constitutional Habeas 
How and whether constitutional habeas applies to aliens is 
unclear. The Court has determined that constitutional habeas means, 
at a minimum, the rights that existed in 1789 when the Constitution 
was ratified.53 As the Court has long held, constitutional habeas 
review is available to aliens when they are detained within the clear 
boundaries of the United States because they can be reached by 
federal court jurisdiction.54 When aliens are held outside the 
traditional geographic boundaries of the United States, however, it 
has been unclear how constitutional habeas applies. 
The general application of any constitutional right to aliens is a 
contentious issue. For example, the Court determined in United States 
v. Verdugo-Urquidez that aliens must have a “voluntary connection” 
to the United States and have accepted societal obligations within the 
country in order to have the constitutional Fourth Amendment 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.55 Verdugo-
Urquidez involved a Mexican national whose property in Mexico was 
searched.56 Because the defendant in that case had not contributed to 
society in the United States, and the search of his premises occurred 
outside the United States, he did not have either the connections or 
the societal obligations that would confer on him Fourth Amendment 
rights.57 
Verdugo-Urquidez, however, concerned events that occurred 
entirely within the sovereign territory of another country: Mexico. As 
Justice Kennedy noted in his concurring opinion, “the Constitution 
 
 51. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e)(1), (2) (West 2008). 
 52. This process is described in more detail infra notes 73–78 and accompanying text. 
 53. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). 
 54. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (stating that Court can entertain habeas petitions 
of German enemy aliens captured and detained in United States territory); see also In re 
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (holding that the Court can entertain the habeas petition of an 
enemy alien being held in the Philippines, which was at the time a United States territorial 
possession). 
 55. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990). 
 56. Id. at 262. 
 57. Id. at 273. 
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does not create, nor do general principles of law create, any juridical 
relation between our country and some undefined, limitless class of 
noncitizens who are beyond our territory.”58 Whether constitutional 
rights should apply in Guantanamo Bay, however—which under 
Rasul is considered within the control and jurisdiction of the United 
States—is necessarily different because Guantanamo is within the 
control and jurisdiction of the United States. According to Justice 
Kennedy, Verdugo-Urquidez stands for the proposition that the Court 
must interpret provisions of the Constitution, such as the Fourth 
Amendment, “in light of the undoubted power of the United States to 
take actions to assert its legitimate power and authority abroad.”59 
This left the door open for more liberal application of constitutional 
rights in places like Guantanamo Bay, especially for rights as 
fundamental as habeas corpus.  
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rasul continued this line 
of logic.60 Justice Kennedy asserted that aliens may have some 
constitutional habeas rights in a place like Guantanamo Bay, even 
though Guantanamo is, at least by contract, not in the “sovereign 
territory” of the United States.61 Justice Kennedy, in distinguishing 
between the United States’ involvement in Guantanamo Bay and its 
involvement in other sovereign territories, invoked Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, a case in which several German enemy combatants held 
by the United States in Germany attempted to petition the Court for 
habeas corpus.62 In Eisentrager, the Court ruled that the petitioners 
were outside the realm of the Constitution, and that their detention 
and trial by military commission fell squarely within the wartime 
powers of the Executive Branch.63 The Court enumerated six factors 
on which this decision depended, including that the detainee: 
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United 
States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in 
military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted 
 
 58. Id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 59. Id. at 277. 
 60. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. (citing Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, Art. III, T.S. No. 
418 (Feb. 23, 1903) (stating that sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay remains with Cuba)). 
 62. Id. at 487–88 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager. 339 U.S. 763 (1950)). 
 63. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 399 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) (“Certainly it is not the function of the 
Judiciary to entertain private litigation—even by a citizen—which challenges the legality, the 
wisdom, or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in sending our armed forces abroad or to 
any particular region . . . the issue tendered . . . involves a challenge to conduct of diplomatic 
and foreign affairs, for which the President is exclusively responsible.”). 
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by a Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for 
offenses against laws of war committed outside the Untied States; 
(f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United States.64 
Justice Kennedy, in his Rasul concurrence, found that the situation 
of the detainees at Guantanamo differed from that of the detainees in 
Eisentrager in two important ways: (1) the Rasul detainees had not at 
all times been imprisoned outside the United States; and (2) the Rasul 
detainees had been held indefinitely without any legal proceedings to 
determine their status.65 Noting that the agreement with Cuba for 
control of Guantanamo Bay was “no ordinary lease” because of the 
“unchallenged and indefinite control” it gave the United States, 
Kennedy concluded that Guantanamo Bay was “in every practical 
respect a United States territory,” producing “a place that belongs to 
the United States, [and] extending the ‘implied protection’ of the 
United States to it.”66 
C. Adequate Substitute for Habeas Review 
When a person has a constitutional right to habeas corpus, the 
government must either allow that person to file a habeas corpus 
petition in federal court or provide an “adequate and effective” 
substitute for the habeas corpus remedy.67 In Swain v. Pressley, the 
case that set this rule for habeas corpus substitutes, the Court 
considered a law that Congress implemented in the District of 
Columbia that modified the procedure for petitioning the federal 
courts for habeas corpus relief.68 In that case, however, the Superior 
Court in the District of Columbia provided procedures that were 
nearly identical to, if not entirely the same as, those in the previous, 
more traditional habeas corpus scheme.69 
The only other case in which the procedure was deemed 
“adequate and effective” for replacing habeas was United States v. 
 
 64. Id. at 777. 
 65. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 66. Id. (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777–78). 
 67. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977). 
 68. Id. at 381–82. 
 69. See id. at 377 n.9 (stating that the new procedures were “modeled on” the habeas 
statute with only “necessary technical changes” and that they contain “almost identical” 
language) (internal citation omitted); see also Brief for Boumediene Petitioners, supra note 13, 
at 18. 
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Hayman.70 In that case, the Supreme Court did not provide any 
additional clarification as to what constitutes an “adequate and 
effective” substitute for habeas.71 Therefore, prior to Boumediene, the 
Court had not determined whether a process that provides 
substantially or even marginally fewer procedural safetguards than 
traditional habeas corpus review could still serve as an adequate and 
effective substitute.72 
In response to Hamdi and Rasul, the Executive branch created the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) process, which is a 
substitute for habeas corpus.73 Modeled on the Article 5 tribunals in 
the Third Geneva Convention, the CSRTs are intended to be “a 
formal review of all information related to a detainee to determine 
whether each person meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy 
combatant.”74 At these proceedings, the detainees are afforded notice 
and an unclassified summary of information against them, as well as 
an opportunity to present reasonably available evidence.75 The 
detainee also receives a personal representative, though not a lawyer, 
to help the detainee present his or her case.76 The tribunal itself 
 
 70. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952); see also Brief for Boumediene 
Petitioners, supra note 13, at 18. 
 71. See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 223 (stating that the court did not have to reach the 
constitutional question on “adequate and effective” review procedures because the applicable 
law creating a habeas corpus substitute allowed for habeas corpus review if the procedure was 
deemed inadequate or ineffective). 
 72. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), provides some clues as to what the Supreme 
Court would rule is the constitutionally “adequate and effective” procedure required for 
determining the combatant status of detainees; however, the part of the opinion dealing with 
determining combatant status is likely dicta, as Hamdi was not essentially concerned with what 
is considered adequate process. Hamdi was a United States citizen captured on the battlefield in 
Afghanistan and subsequently detained first at Guantanamo Bay and then Norfolk, Virginia, 
and finally Charleston, South Carolina. Id. at 510. In his challenge to this detention, a plurality 
of the Court commented on the process required for making a constitutional enemy combatant 
determination, including “notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity 
to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.” Id. at 533. The 
Court also mentioned that “access to counsel in connection with the proceedings” was essential. 
Id. at 539. Note, however, that Hamdi was a citizen of the United States and thus may be 
afforded more rights under the Constitution because of his citizenship. The Court’s analysis, 
however, remains instructive in that it shows what the Court deems to be “adequate” process 
with regards to the legality of detention of enemy combatants in the War on Terror. 
 73. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 986–87 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 74. Department of Defense, “Guantanamo Detainee Processes” (Oct. 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/d20050908process.pdf. 
 75. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of 
the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, 1–2, July 7, 2004, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. 
 76. Id. at 1. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/27/2009 10:13:50 AM 
2009] BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH 257 
consists of three military officers uninvolved in the capture, detention, 
or interrogation of the detainee.77 Independent review of the CSRT’s 
decision, based on the record provided by the CSRT, is provided in 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.78 
IV.  HOLDING 
In a 5-4 decision, a majority of the Court, in an opinion written by 
Justice Kennedy, held that all detainees at Guantanamo Bay have a 
constitutional right to habeas corpus review of their detentions; that 
Section 7 of the MCA, which denied detainees at Guantanamo access 
to the federal courts, was an unconstitutional suspension of that right; 
and that the CSRT proceedings were not an adequate substitute for 
habeas review.79 
In deciding that Guantanamo detainees have a constitutional right 
to habeas review, the Court focused on two main questions it had yet 
to resolve: whether the detainees are barred from seeking habeas 
corpus review because of either (1) their enemy combatant status or 
(2) their physical location.80  To answer the first 
question, the majority relied on both the history of the Constitution 
and the history of habeas corpus as it stood in 1789.81 The majority 
found that “[t]he Framers viewed freedom from unlawful restraint as 
a fundamental precept of liberty, and they understood the writ of 
habeas corpus as a vital instrument to secure that freedom.”82 Within 
the Court’s historical analysis of the Writ prior to 1789, the Court 
found less support for its constitutional interpretation of the 
Suspension Clause. It did, however, note that although historical 
authorities “suggest the common-law courts abstained altogether 
from matters involving prisoners of war, there was greater 
justification for doing so in the context of declared wars with other 
nation states.”83 The War on Terror, which was not formally declared a 
war by Congress and is being fought against militia groups not 
traditionally aligned with a state, is not this type of war. Finally, 
 
 77. Id. at 1–2. 
 78. Detainee Treatment Act § 1005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2740 (2005); Military 
Commissions Act § 3(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2603 (Oct. 28, 2006). 
 79. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008). 
 80. Id. at 2244. 
 81. Id. at 2244–45. 
 82. Id. at 2244. 
 83. Id. at 2248–49 (emphasis added). 
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because there were seemingly no cases analogous to the situation of 
the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the Court declined to place great 
importance on the historical record.84 
To answer the second question, whether the detainees’ physical 
location at Guantanamo Bay barred them from constitutional habeas 
corpus rights, the Court reviewed its precedent with regards to 
applying constitutional rights to those held or captured outside the 
territory of the United States. The Court found, taking particular note 
of Johnson v. Eisentrager, that within its own precedent, the 
application of such rights often depended on the practicality of the 
application rather than any formal legal restriction.85 The Court 
concluded that although the petitioners in Eisentrager were denied 
access to the federal courts for their habeas corpus claims, the holding 
in that case did not conflict with the idea of granting habeas corpus 
rights to detainees at Guantanamo, as practical considerations, not a 
strict adherence to formal sovereignty, motivate the process of 
applying constitutional rights outside the territory of the United 
States.86 The Court then analyzed the physical and legal relationship 
between the territory of Guantanamo Bay and the United States, 
examining the history of the territory and United States control of the 
base there.87 From the historical record, the Court found that 
Guantanamo Bay and the United States have a special relationship: 
although the United States does not maintain de jure sovereign 
control over Guantanamo, “by virtue of its complete jurisdiction and 
control over the base, [it] maintains de facto sovereignty over this 
territory.”88 
To synthesize its analysis of the scope of the right to habeas 
corpus, the majority relied heavily on a comparison of the facts of 
Boumediene to those of Eisentrager. According to the Court, three 
considerations were important to determining the scope of habeas 
corpus and the Suspension Clause under Eisentrager: “(1) the 
citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process 
through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of 
the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) 
 
 84. Id. at 2251. 
 85. Id. at 2255–56. 
 86. Id. at 2258. 
 87. Id. at 2251–53. 
 88. Id. at 2253 (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004)). 
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the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement 
to the writ.”89 
The status of the Boumediene petitioners, based on this criteria, is 
significantly different from and more contentious than that of the 
World War II prisoners in Eisentrager.90 The Eisentrager petitioners, 
prior to filing for habeas corpus review, had undergone a rigorous, 
adversarial proceeding to determine their enemy combatant status; in 
comparison, the CSRT process provided to the Boumediene 
petitioners was much more limited.91 As to the second factor, the 
location where the petitioners were captured and detained, the Court 
found that although both sets of petitioners were apprehended 
outside of the United States, the detention of the Boumediene 
petitioners—in the de facto sovereign territory of the United States—
contrasted significantly from the detention of the Eisentrager 
petitioners in Germany.92 Finally, the nature of the Boumediene 
petitioners’ detention, in a peaceful territory both close to and under 
the de facto sovereign control of the United States, reduced the threat 
that the extension of constitutional rights to detainees at 
Guantanamo would disrupt the military mission in the War on 
Terror.93 These major distinctions from the Eisentrager detainees 
indicated that application of the Suspension Clause and constitutional 
habeas corpus rights to detainees at Guantanamo Bay was both fairer 
and more practical than it would have been to apply such rights to the 
detainees in Eisentrager.94 
As a result of the Court’s holding that the Constitution applied to 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the Court found that in order for 
Congress to strip detainees of their constitutional entitlement to 
habeas corpus rights, Congress had to invoke the Suspension Clause.95 
Congress stripped the detainees of any rights to access the federal 
courts for habeas review by passing the Military Commissions Act, 
but in order for the suspension to have been constitutional, the 
Court’s precedent dictated that Congress must also have provided an 
adequate substitute for habeas review.96 The Court went on to analyze 
 
 89. Id. at 2259. 
 90. Id. at 2259–60. 
 91. Id. at 2260; see also infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
 92. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260. 
 93. Id. at 2261. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 2262. 
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whether the CSRT process provides such a substitute.97 In doing so, 
the Court laid out two main criteria for assessing the adequacy of a 
substitute for habeas: (1) it must provide a “meaningful opportunity” 
for the prisoner to show that he is being held in violation of the law; 
and (2) it must provide a mechanism by which the adjudicative body 
can order the release of the detainee if he or she is being unlawfully 
detained.98 According to the Court, the rigor of the proceedings 
available to the prisoner also played a role in determining whether 
there was a “meaningful opportunity” to challenge the prisoner’s 
detention, as those initial proceedings will determine the content of 
the record on review.99 
As the Court noted earlier in its opinion, the CSRT proceedings 
provided no lawyer for the detainee and gave only limited access to 
evidence to be used in his defense.100 Additionally, government-
provided evidence in these proceedings was presumed to be 
accurate.101 And although the detainee could ask the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals to review the enemy combatant status 
determination made by the CSRT, “that review process cannot cure 
all defects in the earlier proceedings.”102 The CSRT proceedings had 
many procedural defects, but even if one presumed that these 
proceedings met due process standards, the Court stated that it would 
still find that the CSRTs lacked the adversarial quality required for an 
adequate substitute for habeas corpus review.103 Thus, the Court found 
that Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act was an 
unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus rights. 
In the dissent authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by 
Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia, the dissenters criticized the 
majority opinion on the grounds that the Court should not involve 
itself in the wartime decisions of Congress and the Executive 
branch.104 Citing separation of powers concerns, the Roberts 
dissenters stated that the Court was not in a position to decide 
whether and what process is available to detainees; rather, the Court’s 
 
 97. Id. at 2263. 
 98. Id. at 2266 (citations omitted). 
 99. Id. at 2268. 
 100. Id. at 2260. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 2270–71. 
 104. Id. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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role was only to determine whether the system created by the 
political branches protects the rights the detainees possess.105 
The other dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Scalia and 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas, was 
much more virulent, noting the “disastrous consequences” the Court’s 
opinion will have on the War on Terror.106 The Scalia dissenters stated 
that: 
The game of bait-and-switch that today’s opinion plays upon the 
Nation’s Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us. It 
will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed. That 
consequence would be tolerable if necessary to preserve a time-
honored legal principle vital to our constitutional Republic. But it 
is this Court’s blatant abandonment of such a principle that 
produces the decision today.107 
Although this dissent went on to criticize the historical analysis the 
majority used in its opinion,108 it is certainly this passionate passage 
that will be remembered. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Court’s holding in Boumediene v. Bush, though characterized 
by the dissenters as a violation of the separation of powers, is in line 
with recent precedent and is a plausible interpretation of the Court’s 
past treatment of the habeas corpus issue. Additionally, the majority’s 
emphasis on practicality within the holding puts it in line with the 
Court’s precedent concerning procedural due process. The outcome in 
Boumediene can also be justified using the Mathews v. Eldridge 
procedural balancing test, by asking the question, should detainees 
have access to the federal courts to review their habeas claims? An 
analysis based on the Eldridge test, which requires balancing the 
government’s interest against the individual’s interests in purported 
rights, demonstrates that the detainees’ interest in accessing the 
federal courts for habeas corpus review outweighed the government’s 
interest in denying them such access and thus provides further 
support for the Court’s majority opinion in Boumediene. 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. (emphasis included). 
 108. Id. at 2296–2303. 
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A. Alien Detainee Rights 
The Writ of Habeas Corpus is one of the most fundamental rights 
a person can have because it protects against arbitrary and unlawful 
executive action by providing people with the right to challenge the 
lawfulness of their detentions.109 As the Court noted in Verdugo-
Urquidez, not every constitutional right is integral to the operation of 
a free society, and thus not every right should be applied to aliens 
without connections to the Untied States, but those that are 
fundamental should be given greater deference.110 The fundamental 
nature of the right to habeas corpus alone should be enough to 
override even a strong government interest. 
B. The Government’s Interest 
The Executive, however, undoubtedly has an interest in detaining 
many of the people held at Guantanamo Bay, particularly in light of 
national security interests related to the War on Terror. The 
Authorization for Use of Military Force grants the President the 
ability to use “all necessary and appropriate force” to fight this war 
and to vindicate the people killed on 9/11.111 Generally, in a time of 
war, the national security powers of the Executive extend to military 
detentions of enemy combatants until the war is over so that the 
combatants do not return to the battlefield;112 there is a strong 
national security interest in leaving this Executive power in place. 
Additionally, allowing detainees unlimited habeas review of their 
status as enemy combatants may tie up courts and divert executive 
and military resources from the current conflict. Also, as the 
government in the Boumediene case consistently argued, allowing the 
detainees to have such review would go well beyond any rights 
 
 109. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 110. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (noting that although 
Fourth Amendment rights were not applicable to an alien who was captured and searched 
abroad, other rights, such as Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, are more 
fundamental trial rights and thus may require a different analysis). 
 111. Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 116 
Stat. 224 (2001). 
 112. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (stating that the detention of enemies 
captured on the battlefield “is so fundamental and accepted an incident of war as to be an 
exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use.” 
(quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 4001(a) (West 2008)). 
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detainees have had in past wars.113 The government argued that the 
War on Terror is of a different character than past wars, and that it is 
providing more rights and more process than in past wars to 
detainees, particularly at Guantanamo Bay.114 
Furthermore, removing the determination of combatant status 
from the Executive and military personnel currently in charge of the 
CSRTs and giving it to the judiciary is a risky move, particularly 
because the Executive has more information and expertise in fighting 
wars and conducting foreign relations.115 To involve the courts in the 
combatant status determination, particularly through mechanisms like 
habeas review, would essentially give the judiciary war-fighting 
powers that are constitutionally reserved for the Executive and 
Congress.116 
Finally, Congress expressed its consent to this use of Executive 
power when it passed the DTA and MCA, which undoubtedly showed 
Congress’s intent to strip aliens at Guantanamo Bay of any right to 
habeas review in federal courts. When the Executive acts with the 
authorization of Congress, his powers are at their zenith.117 When the 
Court decided Rasul, Congress had not yet authorized stripping 
habeas review from detainees at Guantanamo. But because Congress, 
after Rasul, passed legislation in support of stripping habeas rights 
from detainees at Guantanamo, the separation of powers argument 
that Justice Kennedy used in his concurrence in Rasul118 no longer 
applies. In a time of war, the Executive’s powers are inarguably 
stronger than during a time of peace, and the assent of Congress to 
further expand those powers creates a presumption in the Executive’s 
favor. The Court should thus defer to Executive decisions, supported 
by Congress, instead of taking on a “war-making” power of its own. 
C. The Balance of Detainee and Government Interests 
Undoubtedly, the government retains a strong interest in 
indefinitely holding some of the detainees for which it has strong 
 
 113. See Brief of Respondent at 9, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 U.S. 2229 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 
06-1196). 
 114. Id. 
 115. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321 (1936). 
 116. Id. at 318–21. 
 117. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–36 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 118. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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evidence of terrorist involvement while it fights the War on Terror. 
Despite this interest, however, the potentially indefinite nature of the 
war, combined with the detainees’ interest in freedom from arbitrary 
detention causes the balance between the detainees’ rights and the 
government’s interest, in Boumediene as well as in any other related 
instance of detention, to tip in favor of the detainees. 
Although we know little about the detainees at Guantanamo, we 
can assume for the purpose of argument that many of them were 
picked up on the battlefield in Afghanistan or Iraq. Several of these 
detainees, however, were not apprehended on the battlefield, 
including some of the petitioners in Boumediene who were instead 
picked up in Bosnia for allegedly plotting to bomb the United States 
Embassy in Sarajevo.119 Although one could argue that the entire 
world constitutes the battlefield in the War on Terror, the Court has 
not expanded the scope of the battlefield beyond Afghanistan.120 In a 
battlefield context, the military and the Executive need to determine 
more quickly the status of the people they wish to detain, and this 
urgency often means that government authorities have fewer 
constitutional restraints placed upon their determinations concerning 
a prisoner’s combatant status. When a person is picked up outside of 
the battlefield context, however, there is less urgency to make that 
combatant status determination. And when the military moves that 
person to a neutral location for detention, that urgency decreases 
further and the argument for depriving the person of the rights 
provided by the Constitution diminishes. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The nature of detention in the War on Terror, which has the 
potential to deprive people deemed enemy combatants of their 
liberty for decades, provided a novel and unique legal conundrum for 
the Court. In the Boumediene v. Bush decision, the Court implicitly 
balanced the interests of the government in fighting this war against 
those of detainees whose liberty was indefinitely in jeopardy. This 
indefinite deprivation of liberty, combined with the lack of practical 
obstacles to giving these detainees access to the federal courts, shifted 
the balance between national security and habeas rights under the 
 
 119. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 120. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that the scope of the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force extends only to Afghanistan). 
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Constitution in the direction of the detainees. Because applying 
habeas corpus and due process rights was both practical and 
necessary for the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the Court correctly 
chose to err on the side of liberty. Although the Court’s more 
conservative members might vehemently disagree, such a choice by 
the Court in a time of fear is both brave and reassuring to all who face 
deprivations of their civil liberties. 
 
